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SECURITY UNDER THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT:
ANALYZING THE SUPREME COURT'S
FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING
PERMISSIBLE BANK ACTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between commercial banking and investment
banking has become increasingly blurred. As part of this trend,
commercial banks have begun to deal in commercial paper which,
traditionally, has been traded exclusively by investment banks.' The
term commercial paper refers to prime quality, short-term, 2 un-
secured promissory notes which large, financially strong corpora-
tions issue to fund seasonal needs.3 The Supreme Court recently
1 Almost all nonbank financial institutions have widened their product lines to in-
dude areas traditionally reserved for banks. For example, securities firms have entered
the retail banking business by offering money market investments. These firms typically
do not lend directly to corporations, but they do compete with commercial banks for
short-term loans by acting as agents in the commercial paper market. Commercial
banks have responded to increased competition from the securities industry by adding
such products as discount brokeraging, asset management accounts, home banking, and
data processing. See generally D. CRANE, THE EFFECrs OF BANKING DEREGULA- ION (1983)
(explaining overlap of securities firms with commercial banks). See also Simpson & Par-
kinson, Some Implications of Financial Innovations in the United States, 70 FED. RESERVE BULL.
621 (1984) (study focusing on deregulation and market innovation in depository
institutions).
2 Most commercial paper matures in 60 days or less. See Hurley, The Commercial
Paper Market, 63 FED. RESERVE BULL. 525 (1977).
3 Id. Only about 1,200 firms borrow money in the commercial paper market. Hur-
ley, The Commercial Paper Market Since the Mid-Seventies, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 327 (1982).
Such firms offer commercial paper to investors either directly or through dealers. Hur-
ley, supra note 2, at 525.
In the early 1960s only a limited number of companies used the commercial paper
market. However, during the tight money periods in 1966, 1969-70, and 1973-74, more
nonfinancial firms began obtaining funds in the commerical paper market. Banks unin-
tentionally encouraged this movement into commercial paper by setting the prime rate
higher than the commercial paper rate. Id. at 531-35. Because of increased use, the
commerical paper market is now an important source of capital and, consequently, sig-
nificantly affects the level of commercial lending by commercial banks. See D. CRANE,
supra note 1, at 55 (market share of domestically chartered banks fell from 88.2% of
commercial loan market in 1973 to 77.3% in 1981, while during this same period, mar-
ket share of commercial paper issued by nonfinancial corporations rose from 5.0% to
12.9%).
Commercial paper not only competes on the asset side of a bank's balance sheet
with short-term commercial loans, but also competes on the liability side by offering an
alternative short-term investment to the bank's certificates of deposits. COMMERCIAL
BANKING 1975 AND 1980, at 70 (G. Fisher ed. 1970). Money market funds are the pri-
mary purchasers of commercial paper. Bank trust departments, life insurance compa-
les, pension funds, nonprofit organizations, and nonfinancial corporations also
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held 4 that commercial paper is a security for the purposes of the
Glass-Steagall Act 5 (the Act) which prohibits banks from dealing in
securities. 6 Therefore, commercial banks are now prohibited from
selling, underwriting, or distributing third party commercial paper.
This Note attacks the Court's conclusion that commercial paper
constitutes a security under the Act. First, this Note introduces two
approaches which the Court used in earlier cases to determine
whether a particular financial iristrument constitutes a security: the
literal analysis focuses on the facial meaning of the statute;7 the non-
literal or transactional analysis focuses on the role of the commer-
cial bank in dealing with financial instruments.8 Then the two-part
analysis the court used to conclude that commercial paper is a secur-
ity will be outlined9 and criticized. 10
This Note rejects the Court's literal analysis of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act because it disregards the underlying objective of the Act, to
separate commercial banking from investment banking." Although
the Court's transactional analysis may be useful in distinguishing
commercial banks from investment banks, it fails to consider the
functional attributes of a financial instrument.' 2 The Court should
therefore modify the transactional analysis properly to consider the
instrument's functional attributes.
BACKGROUND
One of the major objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act is to pro-
hibit commercial banks from entering the investment banking busi-
ness.' 3 The Act reflects Congress's determination that the possible
hazards outweigh the "policies of competition, convenience, or ex-
pertise which might otherwise support the entry of commercial
banks" into investment banking.' 4 The separation of investment
purchase commercial paper. Finally, banks hold a small amount of paper for their own
accounts. Hurley, supra, at 333-34.
4 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SIA II].
5 Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
6 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). See generally Glass-Steagall Act-A History of Its Legislative
Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANIUNG LJ. 38 (1975) (tracing development of
regulations restricting securities transactions).
7 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
13 See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971). A bank may partici-
pate in investment banking directly or indirectly through a security affiliate. Id. at 630.
14 Id.
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banking activities from commercial banking activities fosters public
confidence in the banking system because it protects banks against
the risks inherent in the securities business. For example, specula-
tion in the securities business during the 1920s by banks and their
affiliates resulted in tremendous losses when the securities markets
soured. These losses undermined depositor confidence and caused
a rash of bank runs, which led in turn to many bank insolvencies and
an unstable money supply. 15 Thus, by keeping commercial banks
out of investment banking and imprudently investing in risky securi-
ties, Congress sought to avoid this same erosion of depositor
confidence. 16
A second hazard in permitting commercial banks to engage in
investment banking is that the promotional pressure arising from a
bank's participation in investment banking might impair that bank's
ability to function as a disinterested lender. Congress feared that if
a bank were involved in a certain company's security issue, the pres-
sure to make its investment successful might induce the bank to
make unsound loans to that company.' 7 Moreover, commercial
banks might be tempted to make a loan on the belief that the bor-
rower would use it to purchase securities with which the bank was
involved.' 8
Furthermore, participating in the securities business creates
conflicts of interest which may impair a commerical bank's ability to
render disinterested financial advice. For example, a conflict of in-
terest may arise when a commercial bank publicly offers the securi-
ties of its corporate customers. Banks routinely advise corporate
customers on financial matters such as how to structure an issue.
Congress feared that a bank could not impartially advise these cus-
tomers if it stood to gain from distributing a particular security.' 9
Further conflicts may arise where a commercial bank promotes a
certain security to ensure that the issuing corporation will have suffi-
cient funds to repay its outstanding loan with the bank. Because a
successful issue may eliminate a problem loan, the bank may at-
tempt to unload the issue on its customers regardless of the custom-
ers' needs.20
15 See SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2984.
16 See Camp, 401 U.S. at 630.
17 See id. at 631.
18 See id. at 632.
19 See SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2984.
20 See id. at 2985. As a result, bank depositors might suffer losses on these invest-
ments. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 631. Therefore, "the banker who has nothing to sell to his
depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to regard diligently the
safety of depositors than the banker who. . . distribute[s] circulars" to depositors con-
cerning investments on which the banker receives an organization, underwriting, distri-
1196 [Vol. 70:1194
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Sections 1621 and 2122 of the Act are the principal provisions
separating commercial and investment banking activity. However,
each section approaches the problem from a different perspective. 23
Section 16 approaches the problem by restricting the activities of
commerial banks. It requires banks to "purchas[e] and sell. . . se-
curities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for
the account of, customers."' 24 Section 16 also prohibits commercial
banks from purchasing securities, other than "investment securi-
ties" for their own account, and from "underwrit[ing] any issue of
securities or stock." 25 Section 21, however, separates commercial
and investment banking activity by restricting the activity of invest-
ment banks. It prohibits persons conducting specified investment
banking activites from receiving deposits. 26
A. The Camp Court's Two-Part Analysis
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp 27 the Court used a two-
part analysis to determine whether a particular financial instrument
constituted a security under the Glass-Steagall Act. In Camp, First
National City Bank of New York (First National) offered units of par-
bution, or trading commission. Id. at 633 (quoting statement of Sen. Bulldey, 75 CONG.
REc. 9912 (1932)).
21 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). This section states that
[t]he business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without re-
course, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock; Provided, That the [bank] may purchase for its own
account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as
the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe.
Id.
22 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). This section provides that
It shall be unlawful. . . [f]or any person, firm, corporation, association,
business trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing.. . stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits . . . : Provided, That the
provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national banks or State
banks... from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling invest-
ment securities, or issuing securities, to the extent permitted to national
banking associations by [Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act].
Id.§ 378(a)(1).
23 See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
63 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ICI] ("Sections 16 and 21 of the [Act] approach the legis-
lative goal of separating the securities business from the banking business from different
directions.").
24 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
25 Id.
26 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982).
27 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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ticipation in a collective investment plan.28 The units were "freely
redeemable, and transferable to anyone" and included a managing
agency agreement with First National.29 The bank, in its capacity as
managing agent for the fund, invested the fund's assets. The Court
found that although a bank may properly pool assets, act as a man-
aging agent, and purchase stock for customers, the combination of
these powers creates the functional equivalent of a mutual fund.30
The Court addressed the issue of whether the Comptroller of the
Currency may authorize a bank to offer its customers such a fund
created and maintained by the bank, and concluded that a bank of-
fering units in such a fund was "underwriting, issuing, selling, and
distributing .. .securities in violation of sections 16 and 21 of the
[Act]."a'
The Court's analysis in Camp consisted of two parts. First, the
Court undertook a literal analysis to determine whether the Act on
its face prohibited a bank from operating the investment fund in
question. The Court noted that nothing in the language of section
16 or section 21 suggests a narrow reading of the term security.3 2
Therefore, "the sale of an interest in the business of buying, hold-
ing, and selling stocks for investment [should not] be distinguished
from the sale of an interest in a commercial or industrial enter-
prise." 33 Finally, the Court indicated that a broad definition of se-
curity corresponded with Congress's intent "to divorce commercial
banking" from investment banking activities.3 4 Therefore, the
Court held that the statutory language of section 16 and 21 applied
to a bank's sale of redeemable and transferable units of participation
in a common investment fund operated by the bank.
Although the Court found that the term security encompassed
the investment trust managed by First National, it undertook a sec-
ond analysis in which it examined the hazards that sections 16 and
21 sought to prevent.35 In light of these hazards, the Court consid-
ered the nature of the First National's mutual investment fund as
28 Id. at 619. The Comptroller of the Currency approved First National's collective
investment plan pursuant to regulations promulgated in 1963. Id. at 622 & n.7.
29 Id. at 622.
30 Id. at 625. "A mutual fund is an open-end investment company." Id. at 625
n.11. The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an investment company as "any
issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily . . .in the business of
investing. . . in securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1982). An open-end investment
company is one "which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of
which it is the issuer." Id. § 80a-5(a)(1).
31 401 U.S. at 639 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 635.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 636-39. The Court undertook this second analysis because the Comp-
troller of the Currency approved First National's plan and "courts should give great
[Vol. 70:1194
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well as the bank's function in managing the fund. The Court con-
cluded that the potential hazards and abuses flowing from the entry
of banks into the mutual investment business are the "same basic
hazards and abuses" which Congress designed the Glass-Steagall
Act to eliminate.3 6
The Court noted that banks entering the mutual investment
business might impair the public's confidence in the banking sys-
tem.37 A bank operating a mutual investment fund places its reputa-
tion and facilities behind the fund. As a result, public confidence in
the bank would be damaged if the fund proved unsuccessful or was
imprudently managed. Moreover, if the fund developed financial
problems, the bank might attempt to rescue the fund through im-
provident actions.
The promotional pressures in operating an investment fund
produce the conflicts of interest that Congress feared would impair
a bank's ability to render disinterested advice to its customers. Such
an investment fund directly competes with aggressively promoted
funds offered by other investment companies. Therefore, a bank
may feel pressure to promote its investment fund to its customers.
The Court also asserted that the bank's interest in the fund
might lead it to make unsound loans. The bank might exploit its
confidential relationship with other commercial or industrial credi-
tors.3 8 It might also make its credit facilities available to the fund at
the expense of its depositors' best interests.3 9 Finally, talent and
resources might be directed away from the bank's other operations
to promote the fund.40
B. Applications of the Transactional Approach to Commercial
Bank Activity After Camp
Since Camp, the Court has applied its transactional approach in
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Insti-
tute [hereinafter ICI ],41 Securities Industry Association v. Board of Gover-
nors of Federal Reserve System [hereinafter SIA I],42 and Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System [here-
inafter SIA 11]. 4 3 Although only SIA 11 presented the issue of
weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency
charged with the enforcement of that statute." Id. at 626-27.
36 Id. at 639.
37 Id. at 637.
38 See id. at 636-37.
39 See id. at 638.
40 See id.
41 450 U.S. 46 (1980). See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
42 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984). See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
43 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984). See infra notes 59-90 and accompanying text.
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whether a particular financial instrument was a security under the
act, both the ICI and the SIA I courts used the Camp transactional
analysis to determine whether a bank's activity violated the Glass-
Steagall Act.
In ICI the Court applied the transactional analysis to determine
whether a bank holding company may provide investment advice to
a closed-end investment company without violating sections 16 and
21 of the Act.44 After its initial issuance, a closed-end investment
company does not issue additional shares and does not stand ready
to redeem its shares. In contrast, an open-end investment company
or mutual fund will issue new shares and stands ready at any time to
redeem outstanding shares. 45 The Court held that the hazards con-
templated by the Act are not present when a bank provides invest-
ment advice to a closed-end investment company, provided it does
not issue, sell, or underwrite shares in that company.46
The ICI Court distinguished Camp, observing that "[tihe mutual
fund under review in [Camp] was the functional equivalent of an
open-end investment company."' 47 The Court reasoned that be-
cause of the functional attributes of the closed-end investment com-
pany and the strict Federal Reserve Board regulations of such
companies, they did not present the hazards of impairing the bank's
disinterested lending and advice. Because a closed-end investment
company does not redeem its issued shares, the company will not
request additional capital from the bank to cover redemption of its
shares. Moreover, the advisory fee earned by the bank in advising a
closed-end company, based on portfolio value, provides little incen-
tive for a bank to risk its assets by extending imprudent loans to
companies whose stock is held by the investment company.48 Fur-
thermore, the Federal Reserve Board strictly regulates closed-end
44 450 U.S. at 58-68. The Court described the typical relation between an invest-
ment adviser and an investment company:
Investment companies, by pooling the resources of small investors under
the guidance of one manager, provide those investors with diversification
and expert management. Investment advisers generally organize and
manage investment companies pursuant to a contractual arrangement
with the company. In return for a management fee, the adviser selects
the company's investment portfolio and supervises most aspects of its
business.
Id. at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
45 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c) (1985) (defining mutual fund to include these
characteristics).
46 See ICI, 450 U.S. at 66-68.
47 Id. at 65 (footnote omitted); see id at 65 n.36 (describing Camp's mutual fund).
48 Id. at 67. The advisory fee in connection with an open-end fund is typically one-
half of one percent of the value of the fund's assets. Id. The advisory fee associated with
an open-end company or mutual fund increases both with the increase in portfolio value
and through sale of the company's shares. In a closed-end investment company, how-
ever, the advisory fee earned by the advisor increases only if the value of the investment
1200 [Vol. 70:1194
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investment companies.49 These regulations prohibit a bank from
either owning any interest in the investment company or extending
credit to the investment company. 50
The Court also applied a transactional approach in SIA 1.51 In
that case the Court addressed the question of whether the Federal
Reserve Board is authorized to permit a bank holding company, the
BankAmerica Corporation (BankAmerica), to acquire a retail bro-
kerage firm, Charles Schwab and Company (Schwab). The Court
found that the Federal Reserve Board has such authority52 and that
its approval was proper in this case because the Camp concerns were
not present. The Court stated that a loss of depositor confidence
through unsuccessful or imprudent management of the investment
activity was not a concern because Schwab, trading as an agent
rather than as a principal, was "not subject to the vagaries of the
securities markets." 53 The Court added that promotional pressure
was not present because BankAmerica had no salesman's stake in
the securities that Schwab traded.54 Schwab's profits depended
solely upon share volume and not on "the purchase or sale of partic-
ular securities." 55 Consequently, BankAmerica had no incentive to
extend credit to particular securities issuers or to favor particular
securities when managing depositors' assets. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the brokerage activities would not hinder BankAmer-
ica's role as an impartial lender.56 Finally, the Court found that
BankAmerica's ability to render disinterested financial advice to de-
positors was not a concern because Schwab, a discount broker, did
not promote particular securities but merely executed purchase and
portfolio increases. See id. at 67 n.40 (citing SEC Report of Special Study of Securities Markets,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-99, 204-05 (1963)).
49 See 405 U.S. at 52 & nn.12-13, 67.
50 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(g) (1985). The ICI Court further observed that a bank
may not promote an investment fund by rendering partial advice because the regula-
tions prohibit a bank from giving the names of its depositors to the investment company.
450 U.S. at 67 n.39. In addition,
the bank could not act as investment adviser to any investment company
having a similar name; prospectuses and sales literature of the investment
company could not be distributed by the bank; officers and employees of
the bank could not express an opinion with respect to the advisability of
the purchase of securities of the investment company, and the investment
company could not locate its officers in the same building as the bank.
Id.
51 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984).
52 The authority is pursuant to § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
53 104 S. Ct. at 3011.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id.
12011985]
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sell orders placed by its customers. 57
II
ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDER THE LITERAL AND
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACHES
In 1978 the Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust) began
placing the commercial paper of several of its corporate custom-
ers.5 8 It sold only issues receiving the highest rating from at least
one of the commercial paper rating services. Bankers Trust sold
commercial paper to institutional investors who regularly purchased
other short-term instruments from the bank. Although it did not
commit itself to purchase unsold paper, the bank did purchase some
of its issues in the secondary market. The Securities Industry Asso-
ciation (SIA) and A. G. Becker (Becker), a commercial paper dealer,
petitioned the Federal Reserve Board to rule that Bankers Trust's
activities were prohibited by sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall
Act.5 9
The Board ruled that the commercial paper placed by Bankers
Trust was not a security under the Act.60 After concluding that the
literal language of the Act failed to indicate whether commercial pa-
per was a security under the Act, the Board applied a functional
analysis. According to the Board, if the instrument "evidences a
transaction that is more functionally similar to a traditional commer-
cial banking operation than to an investment transaction, . . . the
instrument should not be a security." 61 Because Bankers Trust's
commercial paper was short-term, designed to provide corporations
with cash, and the purchasers were the bank's institutional custom-
ers, the Board determined that this commercial paper was more
similar to commercial lending than to an investment transaction.
Accordingly, the Board ruled that such activity was not prohibited
by the Act.6 2
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
reversed the Board's ruling. The court concluded that commercial
paper represents a " 'note or other security' " under section 21 of
57 Id. at 3010 n.18.
58 See 104 S. Ct. at 2981.
59 See A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom., SIA II, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
60 See 104 S. Ct. at 2982.
61 See id. (quoting FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, STATEMENT REGARDING PETITIONS TO
INITIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION 135a (1980) (on fie at Cornell Law Review)).
62 The Board also set forth guidelines governing a bank's sale of third party com-
mercial paper. These guidelines concerned the type and amount of paper sold, the
kinds of records that must be maintained, and the allowable purchasers. See Policy State-
ment Concerning the Sale of Third Party Commercial Paper by State Member Banks, 46
Fed. Reg. 29,333 (1981).
[Vol. 70:11941202
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the Act.6 3 The district court reasoned that the proper focus under
the functional analysis is on the role of the commercial bank in the
transaction and not the role of the commercial paper in the financial
affairs of the issuer. According to the court, the Board misapplied
the functional approach by "ignor[ing] the specific conduct of the
bank [in performing] transactions unquestionably at the heart of the
securities industry." 64
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals
held that commercial banks may sell third party commercial paper.65
The court first stated that the statutory language of the Act
''strongly suggests that sale of commercial paper should be treated
as a 'loan' rather than a sale of securities for the purposes of the
Act."' 66 However, the court found that neither the Act's language
nor its legislative history expressly determine whether commercial
paper is a security under the Act.67 Turning to a nonliteral ap-
proach, the court endorsed the Board's version of the functional
analysis. According to the court, the Board "correctly focused on
whether the commercial paper marketed by Bankers Trust func-
tioned economically as a loan or as a security [because] the hazards
the Act was designed to prevent" 68 are likely only when commercial
paper functions as a security. The court concluded that Bankers
Trust's commercial paper more closely resembled a loan because of
its extremely low default rate, its very short maturity, and its sophis-
ticated purchasers. 69
In rejecting the district court's nonliteral approach, the court of
appeals noted that marketing the paper did "not have the same eco-
nomic impact on the bank as would marketing of securities."'70
Bankers Trust merely acted as an agent in the transaction and sold
only prime quality, short-term commercial paper; therefore, no dan-
ger existed in placing funds in speculative securities and thereby im-
pairing depositor confidence. Furthermore, commercial paper is
purchased only by large sophisticated investors. Consequently,
Bankers Trust was not in a position to give unreliable financial ad-
vice to these purchasers to promote an issue. Finally, the court
found that Bankers Trust could not use its credit facilities to facili-
tate its commercial paper sales because no investor would borrow
63 A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 519 F. Supp. 602, 612 (D.D.C. 1981).
64 Id. at 615.
65 693 F.2d at 151.
66 Id. at 144.
67 Id. at 147.
68 Id. at 148.
69 Id. at 149.
70 Id. at 150.
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from a commercial bank to buy commercial paper since the interest
rate on commercial loans usually exceeds the rate of return on com-
mercial paper.71 Also, because the paper was low-risk and "issued
only by very solvent corporations," 72 there was little risk that Bank-
ers Trust would advance unsound loans to the issuers. Accordingly,
the court concluded that "[t]he bank's role as seller d[id] not
threaten the bank with those dangers which the . . . Act was
designed to prevent."'73
The Supreme Court in SIA 174 reversed the court of appeals.
The Court concluded that commerical paper falls within the plain
language and legislative purposes of sections 16 and 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. The Court held that commercial paper consti-
tutes a security under the Act and, therefore, commercial banks are
prohibited from placing commercial paper.75 The SIA II Court's
reasoning followed a two-part analysis similar to that articulated in
Camp.
The SIA II Court first undertook a literal analysis of sections 16
and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Because the Act does not define
notes or other securities, the Court " 'start[ed] with the assumption
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used.' "76 Relying on the sweeping language in Camp that
" 'nothing in the phrasing of either § 16 or § 21. . .suggests a nar-
row reading of the word 'securities,' " 77 the Court reasoned that it
should broadly construe the phrase "notes. . .or other securities"
to "separat[e] as completely as possible commercial from invest-
ment banking."78
The Court refined the literal approach employed by Camp by
looking to the securities laws and other contemporaneous statutes
to help define the term security under the Glass-Steagall Act. 79 The
Court examined several laws which were "collectively designed to
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
75 Because the court of appeals had concluded only that Bankers Trust's commer-
cial paper was not a security under the Act, the Supreme Court did not address the issue
of whether the activity of Bankers Trust constituted underwriting under § 16 or "the
business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing" under § 21. Id. at 2992 n.12.
76 Id. at 2986 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)).
77 Id. at 2987 (quoting Camp, 401 U.S. at 635).
78 Id. at 2992 (quoting ICI, 450 U.S. at 70). The Court flatly rejected the Board's
version of the functional approach. Id. at 2988-89 ("[We find it difficult to imagine that
Congress intended the Board to engage in the subtle and ad hoc 'functional analysis'
described by the Board.").
79 In construing the meaning of security under § 16 and § 21, the Camp Court made
no reference to the securities laws or other statutes' definitions. See supra notes 27-40
and accompanying text.
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restore public confidence in financial markets" and found "consid-
erable evidence" that the terms security and note include commer-
cial paper.80 Each of these statutes contains an explicit exemption
for commercial paper. The Court reasoned that the absence of such
an exemption in the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that Congress in-
tended the term security to include commercial paper.81
The Court next applied a transactional analysis to Bankers
Trust's commercial paper activities to determine whether such com-
mercial paper is a security under the Act.8 2 The Court distinguished
the transactional approach, which focuses on the role of the bank,
from the Board's functional analysis, which centers on the nature of
the financial instrument.8 3 The Court found the Board's approach
deficient because it "misapprehends Congress' concerns with com-
mercial bank involvement in marketing securities."'8 4 The func-
tional approach may prevent future bank losses by prohibiting a
bank from underwriting speculative, long-term investments. How-
ever, according to the Court, that approach fails to address "the role
of [the] bank as a promoter of securities [which is] fundamentally
incompatible with its role as a disinterested lender and advisor."8 5
Furthermore, the Court rejected the notion that the functional at-
tributes of commercial paper could affect the role of the bank in
selling that paper. The Act's prohibition, the Court emphasized, de-
pends neither on the extreme safety of commercial paper nor on the
sophistication of its purchasers.8 6
The Court concluded that Bankers Trust's transactional role
produced essentially the same hazards as those articulated in
Camp.8 7 First, a bank dealing in the commercial paper market risks
losing the confidence of its depositors because the bank may use its
depositor list to locate commercial paper customers. If the issuer
thereafter defaults, depositors induced by the bank to purchase the
paper may lose confidence in the bank.
Second, the SIA H Court noted that a pecuniary interest in a
particular investment offering may "'impair [the bank's] ability to
function as an impartial source of credit.' "88 A bank may feel pres-
80 SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2987 (citing the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a (1982); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982); and
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1982)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2989-92.
83 Id. at 2989.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2990-91.
87 See id. at 2989-92.
88 Id. at 2989 (quoting Camp, 401 U.S. at 631).
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sure to enhance the marketability of an issue by extending back-up
credit to the issuer. Furthermore, because a commercial bank will
be competing with other dealers to sell commercial paper, a bank
may feel forced to purchase its unsold commercial paper "in order
to demonstrate the reliability of its distribution system, even if the
paper does not meet the bank's normal credit standards."8 9
Third, if a commercial bank markets commercial paper, the
conflict of interest may impair the bank's ability to render disinter-
ested financial advice to its depositors.90 This potential for abuse
becomes acute when a bank distributes the commercial paper of a
financially troubled commercial loan customer who will use the pro-
ceeds to retire an outstanding debt owed to the bank. In such a
situation, the bank would have a strong interest in the success of the
commercial paper offering because a successful distribution would
eliminate a problem loan.
III
ANALYSIS
The SIA 11 Court's two-part analysis is seriously flawed. First,
the Court's literal analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act is unworkable.
There is no ordinary meaning of the criticial terms in sections 16
and 21 to support the Court's conclusion that commercial paper is a
security. Moreover, the Court's reliance on the securities laws to
define security under the Act is misplaced. Second, the SIA 11
Court's transactional approach fails to recognize that the functional
attributes of a financial instrument determine the bank's transac-
tional role. Therefore, the SIA II Court's conclusion that commer-
cial paper is a security under the Act is erroneous.
A. The SIA II Court's Misapplication of the Literal Analysis
The literal analysis focuses on whether the statutory language
clearly prohibits the activity in question. This analysis is workable
only when the activity dearly violates the applicable statute, as the
mutual fund in Camp violated the Glass-Steagall Act. However,
when financial instruments such as commercial paper are at issue,
no literal meaning of the critical terms in the Act indicates that com-
mercial paper is a security. Consequently, the formalistic and over-
simplified literal approach becomes problematic.
The decision in SIA II misuses the literal approach. The SIA II
Court substantially relied on the Securities Act of 1933 and other
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2990.
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legislation to infer Congress's meaning of the term security.91 This
analogy is inappropriate, however, because the Glass-Steagall Act
and the securities laws were intended to serve different purposes.
The Glass-Steagall Act was designed to prohibit commercial banks
from engaging in investment banking activities. In contrast, the se-
curities laws were intended to regulate the capital markets. 92 Thus,
congressional objectives did not require that the term security have
an identical meaning under the two laws. Securities under the se-
curities laws includes instruments that are not securities under the
Glass-Steagall Act. For example, a bankers' acceptance is a security
under the securities laws, but not under the Glass-Steagall Act. 93
Thus, the SIA 11 Court's literal analysis is an improper method
of determining whether commercial paper is a security under the
Act. The Court's literal approach merely applies formalistic rules,
in lieu of careful consideration of the underlying purpose of the Act,
to separate investment banking from commercial banking. By disre-
91 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
92 See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("primary
purpose" of securities legislation of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate abuses from "the
capital market of the enterprise system" and "to prevent fraud and to protect the inter-
ests of investors").
93 The Board determined that such instruments were not securities under the
Glass-Steagall Act. See SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2999-3000 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Letter from Secretary of the Board of Federal Reserve Agency, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (June 8, 1934) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
Furthermore, a facial construction which characterizes commercial paper as a secur-
ity under the Act creates contradictions in long-established federal banking policy.
Commercial banks routinely purchase commercial paper for their own accounts. See A.
GREEF, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER HOUSE IN THE UNrTED STATES 96 (1938) ("by 1900
[commercial banks] were purchasing 95 per cent or more of the total volume of paper
sold by dealers each year"); see also N. BAXTER, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET 76-81
(1966) (statistical data regarding commercial banks' investment in commercial paper).
Section 16, however, prohibits banks from purchasing securities and stocks, other than
"investment securities," for their own accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. 1984).
Section 16 defines "investment securities" as "marketable obligations, evidencing
indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation in the form of
bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly known as investment securities under such
further definition of the term 'investment securities' as may by regulation be prescribed
by the Comptroller of the Currency." Id. The Comptroller has stated that "[t]he term
'investment security' means a marketable obligation in the form of a bond, note, or de-
benture which is commonly regarded as an investment security. It does not include
investments which are predominantly speculative in nature." 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(b) (1984).
In banking practice commercial paper has never been regarded as an investment
security. On the contrary, it has been a long-standing banking policy to regard commer-
cial paper as a loan, not as an investment security. See SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2996
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting Comptroller's chief counsel's position that commer-
cial paper is not investment security).
The SIA II Court did not decide whether commercial paper is an investment secur-
ity under the Act. SIA II, 104 S. Ct. at 2991 n.l 1 (Court suggested that phrase "dis-
counting and negotiating promissory notes" gives commercial bank authority to acquire
commercial paper for its own account because such activity is not the "business of deal-
ing" in securities).
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garding the purpose of the Act and relying instead on oversimplified
statutory analogues, the SIA II Court incorrectly concluded that
commercial paper is a security for the purposes of the Glass-Steagall
Act.
B. The SIA H Court's Misapplication of the Transactional
Analysis
The SIA II Court also applied a transactional analysis to estab-
lish that commerical banks should not be allowed to deal in third
party commercial paper.94 Instead of applying the Board's func-
tional version of the transactional analysis, the Court completely
disregarded the functional characteristics of commercial paper and
focused only on the bank's role in dealing with commercial paper.
Thus, the SIA II Court failed to consider how commercial paper's
functional attributes affect the bank's role in the commercial paper
transaction. Consequently, the Court erroneously held that com-
mercial paper is a security under the Act.
Permitting banks to deal in commercial paper will not unduly
risk a reduction in depositor confidence. Although commercial
bank participation in the commerical paper market may create a risk
to depositor confidence, this risk is no greater than that resulting
from traditional commercial banking activities.95 For example,
whenever a commercial bank extends a loan, there is a possibility of
default.96 Similarly, whenever a bank purchases commercial paper
or extends credit to the issuer, a possibility exists that the paper will
not be paid at maturity. 97
Furthermore, commercial paper's functional attributes tend to
94 See supra note 35.
95 The variability of a bank's portfolio represents the bank's total risk. The bank's
risk in carrying commercial paper must therefore be measured in relation to the bank's
other business activities. A bank will seek to reduce its total risk by investing in instru-
ments with negatively correlated risks. See Wagner & Lau, The Effect of Diversification on
Risk, 27 FIN. ANALYST'S J. 48 (Nov.-Dec. 1971). However, not all of the bank's risk may
be eliminated by diversification. The risk that can be eliminated by diversification is
called unsystematic risk. The risk that diversification will not eliminate is known as mar-
ket risk. Market risk exists because there are economy-wide perils that threaten all busi-
nesses. See R. BREALEY x& S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 125 (1984). As a
result, a business conducting a large number of higher risk activities may have less risk in
total than a business conducting a small number of improperly diversified low risk activi-
ties. See Wagner & Lau, supra, at 51-52 (presenting empirical data supporting proposi-
tion). Allowing commercial banks to sell commercial paper will increase the total risk of
banks only if the market risk rises.
96 Total composite net loan losses for 1983 of holding companies equalled 1/2 of
1% of average loans outstanding. See Morgan Stanley Investment Research, Bank Per-
formance Review 1983 Edition 164-65.
97 Commercial paper defaults during the past 10 years average approximately 1/10
of 1% of average annual commercial paper outstanding. See M. STIGUM, THE MONEY
MARKET 628, 635 (1983); see also A. GREEF, supra note 93, at 313-14 (from 1922 to 1935
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reduce the probability of a default. Independent credit rating serv-
ices evaluate each corporation's commercial paper.98 Accordingly,
only financially strong, highly-rated firms issue commercial paper.99
The short-term maturity of commercial paper further minimizes the
risk of default. Most obligations have an initial maturity of less than
sixty days. 100 The credit condition of a financially sound issuer is
unlikely to deteriorate significantly during such a short period.
Moreover, the banking system provides several mechanisms to pro-
tect against issuer default. For example, the banking system pro-
vides lines of credit to commercial paper issuers to back their paper.
These funds allow companies that are experiencing difficulties to re-
deem their paper without disrupting the financial markets. 101
Allowing banks to deal in commercial paper will not impair a
bank's ability to act as disinterested lender. A commercial bank's
pecuniary interest in a paper offering would not be sufficient to cre-
ate promotional pressures that would impair the bank's ability to
function as an impartial credit source. Because the fees associated
with placing commercial paper are significantly less than those asso-
ciated with longer-term instruments, 10 2 commercial paper place-
less than one percent of firms using the market were unable to redeem their paper); M.
STiGUM, supra, at 635.
98 The five rating services currently evaluating commercial paper are Moody's In-
vestors Serv.; Standard & Poor's Corp.; Fitch Investors Serv.; Duff & Phelps, Inc.; and
McCarthy, Crisanti, Maffei, Inc. Moody's and Standard and Poor's rate more than 900
and 1,000 issuers, respectively. These two services use simple numerical schemes to
distinguish three or four categories of issuers. See Hurley, supra note 3, at 331.
99 See Hurley, supra note 2, at 529; Lowenstein, The Commercial Paper Market and the
Federal Securities Laws, 4 CoRP. L. REv. 128, 129 (1981) (defining commercial paper as
promissory notes issued by financially sound firms).
Nonfinancial corporations account for more than 607o of the commercial paper is-
sued through dealers. Such corporations use paper to meet seasonal needs, as a substi-
tute for bank credit or to await the improvement of longer-term market conditions.
Most of these firms have a net worth over $100 million. The few that are worth as low as
$50 million are not heavily leveraged and have very good financial records or a well-
established parent company. Financial corporations using the dealer market usually
have a net worth on the order of $40-50 million. Accordingly, financial companies in the
dealer market often have lower commercial paper ratings and pay higher interest rates
than other borrowers. See Hurley, supra note 2, at 527-28.
100 Hurley, supra note 2, at 530. The average maturity on dealer-placed paper
ranges from 30 to 45 days. Id. Lower quality commercial paper tends to have a short
maturity, as issuers attempt to design the maturity to appeal to the investor's caution.
Short maturities allow investors to withdraw quickly if the issuer shows signs of financial
difficulty. Consequently, commercial paper represents a volatile source of funds for
weak borrowers.
101 In addition, lenders support commercial paper through "irrevocable commit-
ments to lend" under which a bank lends the issuer funds to cover its outstanding notes.
Banks also extend loans at below market rates to companies facing temporary impedi-
ments in raising funds in the paper markets. See Hurley, supra note 3, at 332-33.
102 The traditional dealer placement fee is one-eighth of one percent per annum.
This translates to $1,250 for $1 million of commercial paper placed. Lowenstein, supra
note 99, at 132. In comparison, underwriting notes, debentures, or bonds produces an
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ment is not as profitable as other services provided by the bank.
Dealing in such paper merely encourages issuers to use the dealer's
more profitable services.103 Thus, the relatively low fees paid by
commercial paper issuers would provide little incentive for a bank to
extend high-risk credit to a company attempting to continue to
place its paper.
The promotional pressure on a bank is no greater in the com-
mercial paper context than in other traditional bank credit transac-
tions. In loan participations and syndications, for example, the lead
bank solicits lenders who are willing to extend credit to a particular
borrower and prepares a financial summary of the borrower for the
prospective lenders.' 0 4 The lead bank receives a fee from the bor-
rower for arranging the loan participation or syndication.10 5 In ad-
dition, the lead bank charges the participant banks a fee for
managing the arrangement. 10 6 Loan participations and syndica-
tions, however, are not securities under the Act or under the securi-
ties laws.' 0 7
Bank participation in the commercial paper market is unlikely
to create conflicts of interest that unduly impair a bank's ability to
act as a disinterested advisor to its customers. The possible conflicts
of interest that would result from dealing in commercial paper'08
investment banking fee of $8,000 per $1 million of debt sold. See D. DARsT, THE COM-
PLz-E BOND BooK 239 (1975). The fee paid by the commercial paper issuer "would
provide scant incentive to a bank to risk its assets by making unwise loans to compa-
nies." ICI, 450 U.S. at 67-68 n.40.
103 See Lowenstein, supra note 99, at 132.
104 See Pollock, Notes Issued in Syndicated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32 Bus.
LAw. 537, 538 (1977).
105 See Note, Loan Particpation Agreements as Securities: Judicial Interpretations of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295, 297
(1983).
106 See Pollock, supra note 104. Furthermore, loan participations and syndications
frequently involve nonbank lenders. E.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. United
States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981).
107 See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1174, 1179-85 (6th Cir. 1981) (bank's attempt to classify loan participation as a
security "must fail"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); American Fletcher Mortgage Co.
v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, 1253-55 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Congress
did not intend to regulate commercial loan transactions that would have no impact on
the securities markets."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
108 See generally TwErIETH CENTURY FUND, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1980); Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the
Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE LJ. 102, 104-06 (1981) (discussing conflicts of interest arising
when a commercial bank underwrites commercial paper).
Banks face three types of conflicts of interest when they deal in commercial paper.
They may encourage corporate clients to issue commercial paper to generate distribu-
tion profits for the bank even though the distribution was not needed. They may en-
courage an unnecessary issue to generate cash which the issuer can use to pay off an
outstanding loan to the bank. Finally, banks may be inclined to lend money to custom-
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would not differ from those arising in traditional banking activities.
Traditional activities create
the potential for trust department investment based upon mate-
rial inside information obtained from the bank's commercial activ-
ities, preferential trust or commercial department accommodation
of an important bank customer to the detriment of less-valued
bank customers, and unproductive cash accumulation in trust de-
partment accounts which increases the loanable reserves of the
bank.109
Nevertheless, internal rules and procedures prevent commercial
banks from abusing these conflicts of interest.' 10 Similarly, internal
rules and procedures would effectively deal with the conflicts of in-
terest that result from dealing in commerical paper.
The primary concern underlying the conflict of interest consid-
eration is fairness to all parties."'I If all parties had perfect informa-
tion, conflicts of interest would never arise because the bank would
never be put in a position where it could benefit one person at the
expense of another. In a perfectly informed market, the bank would
serve all customers equally because the market would react nega-
tively to a bank's misdealing. Thus, the concern over conflicts of
interest is a function of the perceived disparity of information in the
market.
Commercial paper is not offered for sale to the general public,
but only to large, financially sophisticated purchasers that regularly
purchase in the commercial paper market. Major purchasers in-
clude money market funds, bank trust departments, life insurance
companies, pension funds, nonprofit organizations, and nonfinan-
cial corporations. 1 2 Conflicts of interest are therefore only a slight
concern because purchasers have the resources to obtain sufficient
ers who issue commercial paper even when that customer is not a sound credit risk. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
109 Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions, and the Separation of Trust and
Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611,613 (1977). See generally E. HERMAN,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENT (1975).
110 See Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More
Permissive Regulation, 97 HAuv. L. REv. 720, 730 (1984). Large commercial banks with
trust departments develop "chinese walls" to prevent abuse of conflict of interest situa-
tions. "Chinese walls" refer to internal procedures which are designed to prevent cer-
tain information from being used by different bank departments. See Herzel & Coiling,
The Chinese Wall Revisited, 6 Copp. L. REv. 116, 119 (1983); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese
Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459, 462 (1975)
("the Chinese Wall is generally the best solution to the inside information problems
created by a single multi service firm's performing potentially conflicting roles").
I11 See Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectives on the
Glass-SteagallAc4 in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 282
(L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979).
112 See Hurley, supra note 3, at 334.
1985] 1211
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
information to assess the risk of the issue and thereby protect their
own interests.
The SIA 11 Court's transactional approach characterizes a finan-
cial instrument as a security only if a bank's role in selling the instru-
ment would produce the hazards that the Glass-Steagall Act sought
to prevent. Although this approach promotes the Act's underlying
objective of separating investment banking from commercial bank-
ing, to successfully accomplish this objective all variables affecting a
bank's role in transacting the instrument must be considered. The
Court in SIA H failed to consider one important variable affecting a
bank's role in dealing with commerical paper: its functional charac-
teristics. As a result, the SIA H Court's transactional analysis was
defective, and the Court erroneously characterized commerical pa-
per as a security under the Glass-Steagall Act.
CONCLUSION
Applying a two-part analysis, the Court in SIA II determined
that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits commercial banks from under-
writing and distributing third party commercial paper. A critical
analysis reveals, however, that the Court's approach is seriously
flawed. The Court's literal analysis merely applies inappropriate
analogies rather than considering the underlying objective of the
Act, to separate commercial banking from investment banking.
Although the SIA II Court's transactional analysis focused on
whether the bank's role in dealing with commercial paper conflicts
with the Act's objective, the approach is flawed because it disregards
the functional attributes of commercial paper and their effect on the
bank's transactional role. Because those attributes tend to eliminate
the hazards the Act sought to prevent, the Court incorrectly found
that the Glass-Steagall Act proscribed commercial banks from deal-
ing in commercial paper. In future cases where the Court must de-
termine whether a particular financial instrument is a security under
the Act, the literal analysis should be discarded, and the transac-
tional analysis should properly consider the instrument's functional
characteristics.
John S. Zieser
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